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Throughout its history, the development of theoretical law and eco-
nomics has depended on, and been shaped by, empirical analyses of law. 
Theoretical law and economics scholars cannot draw persuasive positive or 
normative conclusions about legal rules unless the models employed accu-
rately capture the factors affecting people’s responses to legal rules. Mod-
els thus must accurately describe decision-makers’ decision-making envi-
ronment, available choices, and decision-making processes. Empirical 
analysis plays a vital role in theoretical scholars’ ability to develop such 
models. Empirical analyses can improve theoretical models by testing the 
predictions of models; refuted theoretical predictions regularly spur lead 
theoreticians to revise and improve their models. Empirical analyses also 
contribute by providing direct evidence on the decision-making environ-
ment, available choice sets, or decision-makers’ mental processes. This in-
teraction of empirical analysis and theory has led theoretical law and eco-
nomics to rely increasingly on models predicated on incomplete 
information, incomplete contracting, and decision-making that deviates 
from rational choice theory. 
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Introduction 
Throughout its history, the development of theoretical law and eco-
nomics has depended on, and been shaped by, empirical analyses of law.1 
Theoretical law and economics seeks to achieve one of two goals. Positive 
analyses aim to describe, and in turn predict, legal rules’ effect on people’s 
choices. Normative analyses strive to determine optimal legal rules by em-
ploying models that designed to describe people’s responses to different 
legal rules. The validity of both efforts depends on whether their models2 
accurately predict people’s choices. Thus, positive and normative theoret-
ical law and economics must employ models that capture the features of 
the actual decision-making environment (for example, access to infor-
mation), the actual available choice sets, and the decision-makers’ choice 
processes likely to materially impact people’s choices.3  
Empirical analysis of law plays a vital role in helping theoretical schol-
ars develop models designed to have the “fit” needed to both predict the 
effect of legal rules and serve as a foundation for normative policy.4 It does 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 1. Throughout this Essay, the term “empirical analysis of law” refers to all studies that 
apply replicable methodology to analyze evidence relating to a legal issue. Thus, the term can 
encompass regression analysis of large datasets, experimental studies, analysis of survey data, and 
observational studies. 
 2. Throughout this Essay the term “model” is used to refer to both formal models and 
informal analysis predicated on a set of assumptions, whether explicit or implicit, about the deci-
sion-making environment, the choice set, and the decision-making programs people use to make 
choices.  
 3. The fit between the model and the real world tends to be more important to theoretical 
law and economics than to pure economic theory. Economic theory often seeks to identify how a 
particular feature of a decision-making environment—e.g., asymmetric information—impacts 
choices. Economists can appropriately use what Paul Pfleiderer refers to as “bookshelf” models, 
which are designed to analyze how a particular set of assumptions impacts behavior, but do not 
seek to describe decision-making in the real world. By contrast, positive and normative theoretical 
law and economics generally seek to predicate how legal rules affect behavior in the real world. 
Thus, just as empirical economists seeking to describe actual behavior need to ground their anal-
yses on theories that accurately capture the situation they seek to analyze, descriptive and norma-
tive theoretical law and economics also must employ models that seek to capture the features of 
the decision-making environment, the choices sets, and decision-makers’ processes likely to ma-
terially impact choices. See Paul Pfleiderer, Chameleons: The Misuse of Theoretical Models in 
Finance and Economics, 87 ECONOMICA 81 (2020) (discussing empirical economists’ work). 
 4. Empirical analyses enrich theoretical law and economics only to the extent that the 
empirical studies themselves are valid. Thus, prior to relying on an empirical study, theoretical 
scholars should assess its validity. For example, they should determine whether the study rests on 
a valid theoretical foundation that reflects an appropriate understanding of legal and contractual 
institutions. See, e.g., Pfleiderer, supra note 3. Empirical analyses identifying weaknesses in prior 
empirical studies’ assumptions regarding the legal or contractual landscape include Robert P. 
Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on 
Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2009); Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, 
The Law and Finance of Antitakeover Statutes, 68 STAN. L. REV. 629 (2016); and Holger Spa-
mann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467 (2010). Theoretical 
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so by improving theorists’ understanding of, and ability to correctly char-
acterize, the informational, contractual, institutional, and legal environ-
ment affecting decision-makers, as well as the decision-making processes 
that people employ. Empirical analysis can assist theorists both directly 
and indirectly.  
Empirical studies can aid theoretical analysis directly by providing 
empirical evidence on the material features of a particular decision-making 
environment. For example, empirical analysis can reveal that, contrary to 
theory, decision-makers regularly do not have the information they need 
to make material decisions. Empirical analysis also can enable better mod-
eling of people’s actual decision-making processes. 
Empirical analysis also can affect theoretical analysis indirectly by 
testing the predicted outcomes of theoretical models. Studies showing that 
actual outcomes deviate from predicted outcomes can and have led schol-
ars to identify features of the decision-making environment, and of deci-
sion-makers themselves, that differ materially from those that previously 
served as the foundations for theoretical analysis.  
Of course, the simple fact that a theoretical model deviates from the 
real world does not suffice to justify its revision. A good law and economics 
model removes extraneous complexity in an effort to focus on those fea-
tures of the decision-making environment that are both material to peo-
ple’s decision-making and are potentially affected by the legal rule being 
examined. Yet, while theoretical models need not, and should not, incor-
porate every aspect of the real world in order to predict how people will 
respond to a legal rule, models should accurately reflect those features of 
the actual decision-making environment, the choice set, and the decision-
                                                                                                                                                                                
scholars also should assess datasets employed. Analyses highlighting limitations of popular da-
tasets include Cindy R. Alexander et al., Evaluating Trends in Corporate Sentencing: How Relia-
ble Are the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Data?, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 108 (2000): Eric Helland 
et al., Data Watch: Torturing the Data, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 207 (2005); and Jonathan M. Karpoff 
et al., Proxies and Databases in Financial Misconduct Research, 92 ACCT. REV. 129 (2017). Fi-
nally, theoretical scholars should attend to the appropriateness of the empirical methodology em-
ployed bearing in mind previously identified methodological issues. E.g., William Anderson & 
Martin T. Wells, A Bayesian Hierarchical Regression Approach to Clustered and Longitudinal 
Data in Empirical Legal Studies, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 634 (2010); Robert Bartlett & 
Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s q, 73 VAND. L. REV. 353 (2020); Marianne Bertrand et al., 
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249 (2004); 
A. Colin Cameron et al., Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors, 90 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 414 (2008); see Theodore Eisenberg et al., Addressing the Zeros Problem: 
Regression Models for Outcomes with a Large Proportion of Zeros, with an Application to Trial 
Outcomes, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 161 (2015); Jill E. Fisch et al., The Logic and Limits of 
Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553 (2018); Jonah B. Gelbach, Valid 
Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 495 (2013); Emiliano M. 
Catan & Michael Klausner, Board Declassification and Firm Value: Have Shareholders and 
Boards Really Destroyed Billions in Value? (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 17-39, 
2017) (highlighting the importance of controlling for underlying trends to difference-in-difference 
analysis), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2994559 [https://perma.cc/AUC9-83M7]; see also Saul 
Levmore, The Eventual Decline of Empirical Law and Economics, 38 YALE J. ON REG. 612 
(2021). 
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making processes that are material to, and systematically influence, peo-
ple’s choices. Thus, theorists should presumptively incorporate into their 
analyses empirical evidence revealing that the actual decision-making en-
vironment differs from the assumptions of their models if either economic 
theory suggests the differences are material or empirical analysis finds that 
existing theory does not reliably predict actual outcomes. In turn, theorists 
should presumptively alter their models in response to evidence that actual 
outcomes deviate from predicated outcomes if either observation or em-
pirical evidence suggests that a core assumption of the model is not valid. 
The history of theoretical economic analysis of law is replete with in-
stances where empirical analysis revealed that a widely embraced eco-
nomic model needed to be revised. This Essay examines a few of the ways 
in which empirical analysis has led to improvements in theoretical eco-
nomic analysis of law by providing results that were contrary either to fun-
damental assumptions or predicted outcomes of existing models.5 This Es-
say focuses on analyses that revealed important imperfections in 
individuals’ information sets and in their ability to address economic prob-
lems through contracts that materially affected both the predictive and 
normative conclusions of theoretical analysis. It also discusses empirical 
evidence on people’s decision-making processes that affects outcomes, in-
cluding evidence on how institutions (such as organizations) affect deci-
sions. This Essay shows that empirical analysis, in concert with advances in 
economic theory, has led theoreticians to develop more sophisticated mod-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 5. This Essay focuses on how empirical analysis has enriched theoretical models by im-
proving scholars’ understanding of decision-making environments, the available choice set, and 
the decision-making processes employed. These are only a subset of the many ways that empirical 
analysis can contribute to theoretical law and economics. For example, empirical analysis has re-
vealed that the law affects behavior not only through the sanctions imposed but also through its 
expressive function—its ability to express society’s view that certain actions are socially harmful 
or immoral. E.g., Symposium, How Law Changes What You Want: Positive and Normative Ef-
fects of Law on Values and Preferences, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2021) (explor-
ing this literature); see also Hanoch Dagan et al., Legal Theory for Legal Empiricists, 43 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 292 (2018) (discussing the variety of ways that the law induces legal compliance). Em-
pirical analysis by legal scholars, sociologists, organizational theorists, psychologists and others 
also contributes by improving our understanding of the plethora of ways in which institutions af-
fect behavior—both by directly altering people’s decision-making and by providing alternative 
methods for regulating and coordinating certain transactions. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Jennifer Arlen & Stephan 
Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect Justify Legal Intervention? The Debiasing Effect of Insti-
tutions, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 143 (2015) (showing how involving agents or voting in the decision to 
trade mutes the endowment effect triggered by regret aversion); Björn Bartling & Urs Fisch-
bacher, Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 67 (2012) 
(showing how using agents to divide resources mutes responsibility thereby facilitating unfair al-
locations); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Opting 
out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 115 (1992). Empirical analysis also may enrich our understanding of people’s preferences 
regarding the appropriate goals of their legal or political institutions. See, e.g., Tamar Kricheli 
Katz, Response to Jennifer Arlen on The Essential Role of Empirical Analysis in Developing Law 
and Economics Theory, 38 YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 154 (2021).  
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els. These models tend to focus on decision-making in environments char-
acterized by incomplete information and incomplete contracts, and to re-
flect evidence that people’s decision-making can deviate from rational 
choice.  
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the basic structure of 
classic law and economic models of legal rules predicated on rational 
choice, identifying features of those models particularly amendable to in-
sights from empirical analysis. Part II discusses illustrative examples in the 
areas of consumer contracts, medical malpractice liability, and takeovers 
in which empirical analysis has either spurred the development of new 
models or altered the normative implications of existing models, while re-
taining rational choice theory.6 Part III discusses how empirical analysis of 
human decision-making has spurred theoreticians to incorporate alterna-
tive models of decision-making from rational choice, and the challenges 
posed by such evidence in the effort to develop accurate models of how 
legal rules affect behavior. Part IV concludes. 
I. Rational Choice and Theoretical Law and Economics 
Theoretical law and economics generally relies on rational choice 
models both to examine the effect of legal rules and determine optimal 
laws. Rational choice models share a particular structure: actors with pre-
determined preferences over the available options each selects the option 
that maximizes her welfare (given her preferences). In these models, each 
actor’s choices are affected by her preferences (which are assumed to be 
fixed), the set of options or strategies available to her, the expected costs 
and benefits to her of each option. The expected costs and benefits of each 
option in term depends in part on the information available, how legal 
rules affect each option, and, in some situations, other people’s expected 
behavior.7 Rational choice models thus seek to predict individuals’ behav-
ior in a specific decision-making environment having specified each indi-
vidual’s decision-making function and decision-making environment. This 
analysis serves as the foundation for normative policy prescriptions. 
Theoretical law and economics employs formal and informal models 
to explore how legal rules can alter behavior by altering either the options 
available to people8 or the actual or perceived9 costs or benefits of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 6. See, e.g., Jon Doyle, Rational Decision Making, in THE MIT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
COGNITIVE SCIENCES 701 (Rob A. Wilson & Frank Keil eds., 1999); ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET 
AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1995).  
 7. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Lewis Kornhauser, Can the Law Change Preferences?, 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2021). 
 8. For example, laws that allow (or disallow) contracts with liquidated damages clauses, 
or that preclude doctors from contracting over malpractice liability, alter the choices available to 
contracting parties. 
 9. Laws can alter the information available to people, thereby altering either their or 
other people’s understanding of the consequences of their actions or the set of optimal contract 
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available options. For example, criminal laws directly increase the costs of 
taking the actions the law prohibits by threatening to sanction those who 
engage in the prohibited action.10 Medical malpractice liability also alters 
the perceived cost of options; it also restricts the options available by pro-
hibiting an option: contracting over liability.11  
Theoretical models cannot effectively predict the effect of legal re-
form or identify optimal legal rules unless they accurately capture the fea-
tures of people’s actual decision-making environment that materially af-
fect their choices. Thus, theoretical analysis needs to represent the 
decision-making environment with sufficient accuracy that the choices that 
maximize actors’ preferences in the theoretical model align with those that 
maximize actors’ preferences in the real world situation that the analysis 
seeks to model.12 A model cannot effectively predict how laws will affect 
behavior or help to identify rules that maximize people’s welfare if the 
choices that maximize actors’ welfare in the model differ from those that 
people prefer in the real world, given their actual available information, 
available choices, and the perceived costs and benefits of those choices.  
Accordingly, theoretical analyses that aspire to predict people’s re-
sponses to legal rules must accurately represent the material aspects of the 
decision-making environment that affect people’s responses to legal rules. 
They must correctly reflect the options available (the choice set), the in-
formation available (and its cost), the effect of the law on the expected 
costs and benefits of any options impacts, and individuals’ decision-making 
processes. In some cases, theoretical scholars can identify the key features 
                                                                                                                                                                                
terms that parties can implement. For example, laws can alter beliefs by mandating disclosure that 
provides consumers with additional information on the riskiness of individual producer’s products. 
Alternatively, laws may facilitate contracting between principals and agents by requiring agents 
to inform principals about self-dealing or conflict of interest transactions. 
 10. Laws also can alter the consequences of specific actions in other ways, however, and 
theoretical scholars have developed analyses designed to examine these channels. For example, 
laws also can change the consequences of taking specific actions by changing the “social meaning” 
of the action, thereby either changing the “internal” consequences to the actor of the action or 
changing the external consequences through the impact on how others treat those who engage in 
the option. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 
(1998); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 22-23; Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021 (1996); see also Arlen & Kornhauser, supra note 7 (discussing how expressive law theories 
align with rational choice theory). 
 11. Cases invalidating exculpatory clauses in contracts between physicians or hospitals 
and patients include: Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 446-47 (Cal. 1963); Smith v. 
Hosp. Auth., 287 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Cudnik v. William Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 
891, 895-896 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 
1990). 
 12. This is not to say that the model needs to accurately reflect every input into the deci-
sion. This is neither possible nor desirable. But a model should capture those aspects of the law, 
the decision-making environment, the available choice set, and individuals’ decision-making pro-
cesses that systematically affect outcomes in the situation being studied. See supra note 3 (com-
paring theoretical law and economics and pure economics theory). 
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of the decision-making environment based on casual observation. But of-
ten theorists need the insights provided by empirical analyses.  
Empirical analyses can benefit theoretical models in two ways. First, 
and most obviously, empirical analyses can test theorists’ predictions to de-
termine whether actual behavior conforms to the predictions of the model. 
Evidence from valid empirical analyses13 that actual behavior deviates ma-
terially from the prediction of the model generally suggests that the model 
did not accurately capture a material feature of the decision-making envi-
ronment, the decision-makers, or the law itself.14 
Second, empirical analysis can provide direct evidence about the ap-
propriate assumptions to incorporate into theoretical models. Empirical 
analysis can do this by providing evidence about people’s available infor-
mation, options, or the consequences to people of different options. Theo-
rists do not always need to modify models in response to evidence that the 
real world differs from the assumptions of the model. Yet they do need to 
do so if evidence reveals that the decision-making environment diverges 
from the assumptions employed in the models and either empirical evi-
dence finds that people’s actual choices diverge from the predictions of the 
model or economic theory suggests that altering to model to better repre-
sent the actual decision-making environment would have a material effect 
on agents’ choices.  
Throughout law and economics history, empirical analysis has helped 
to improve theoretical analysis through both of these channels. In so doing, 
empirical analysis has helped lead to theories that are better able to predict 
behavior. It also has improved the theoretical frameworks used as a basis 
for normative predictions. 
II. Contributions of Empirical Analyses to Theoretical Law and 
Economics 
This Part provides some illustrative examples of how empirical anal-
ysis has led to insights that enriched and arguably improved law and eco-
nomics theory. The interplay between empirical analysis and theory dates 
back to the earliest days of the development of law and economics. As a 
result, there are more examples than can be considered in this Essay. This 
Part selects only a few examples of how empirical analysis has prompted 
changes to theoretical models that yielded new insights. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 13. See supra note 4. 
 14. This presumption does not apply, however, if the empirical analysis itself is fraught 
with issues, such as data limitations, endogeneity problems or omitted variables. Moreover, em-
pirical analysis on outcomes of existing law often is not a good measure of the validity of models 
of optimal laws, unless the models of optimal laws identify laws that conform to the existing law 
tested in the study. 
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A. Evidence About the Informational Environment 
1. Empirical Evidence Bearing on Normative Implications of 
Existing Theory 
One of the most fundamental normative issues in law and economics 
is determining situations under which government need not regulate an ac-
tivity that risks harm to others because the potential injurer and victims 
can optimally address the risk through private arrangements, such as con-
tracts or market forces.15  
Ronald Coase famously observed that the existence of externalities 
does not suffice to justify legal intervention.16 Legal intervention is only 
needed when the parties involved—for example, an injurer and a potential 
victim in a tort case or two contracting parties in a contracts case—cannot 
induce optimal risk reduction through private means. Coase focused on the 
impediment that transactions costs pose for optimal regulation through 
private arrangements. Subsequent scholars analyzing product liability and 
medical malpractice identified imperfect information as a source of ineffi-
ciency undermining private action, and thereby justifying government in-
tervention. They concluded that liability was not needed in order to induce 
producers and medical caregivers to take optimal care and undertake the 
optimal level of the activity if consumers are perfectly informed about the 
risks of the product.17 
The claim that contractual liability could be optimal was further 
strengthened by theoretical models showing that contracting over liability 
would induce producers to invest optimally in care, even if consumers do 
not know product risks, if consumers know the costs and deterrence bene-
fits of imposing liability by contract.18 Scholars claims that in this situation 
the parties have optimal incentives to impose liability by contract.19 This 
latter claim does not require consumers and patients to know the expected 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 15. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  
 16. Id. 
 17. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941 (1963); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Pro-
ducer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977); see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Strict Liability vs. 
Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 363 (1980); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability 
Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.1 (1980). 
 18. The argument that contracting over liability could be efficient even if people cannot 
assess quality differences in individual providers is particularly important to the debate over mal-
practice liability given the wealth of evidence that patients cannot assess either the differences in 
expected outcomes of obtaining services from one hospital or provider versus another or the ap-
propriateness of treatments provided to them. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, 
Malpractice Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 
1938-29 & n. 67 (2003) (discussing evidence that patients lack information to assess the quality of 
care they are provided). 
 19. Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure 
About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981); George L. Priest, A Theory of Consumer 
Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981). 
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harm associated with individual producers. But, among other require-
ments, consumers and patients must know the terms of the contracts pre-
sented to them in the standard form contracts offered to them by producers 
or medical providers and must know how liability would alter their ex-
pected risk of harm.20 
Both theory and anecdotal evidence suggests that this informational 
requirement often is not satisfied. For one, it often is optimal for consum-
ers and patients to not to read standard form contracts.21 In this case, mar-
ket forces would not lead to efficient contracting over liability. Moreover, 
the observation that people often optimally do not read standard form con-
tracts also potentially implies that legal intervention might be needed to 
police substantive contract terms in standard form contracts, in order to 
safeguard consumers from abusive contract terms.  
In an important article, Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde proposed a 
clever solution to this impediment to optimal contractual liability. They 
showed that even if most consumers do not read standard form contracts, 
market forces nevertheless could provide producers with incentives to of-
fer optimal contractual liability terms if a sufficiently large minority of 
those consumers whose willingness to pay is sensitive to contract terms do 
read, and are informed the effects of, the liability terms in contracts.22 This 
claim that standard form contracting can be rendered efficient by an in-
formed minority was embraced by scholars in a variety of areas to argue 
against legal regulation of contracts.23  
Yet this argument that contracting is efficient24 only holds if the per-
centage of informed quality-sensitive consumers is sufficiently large that 
producers are better off offering higher quality (and higher cost) contract 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 20. In addition, consumers must understand how contracting into liability affects their 
expected risk of harm. This requirement is rarely satisfied. See Jennifer Arlen, Private Contractual 
Alternatives to Malpractice Liability, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 245 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006); Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy 
of Neocontractual Proposals for Products Liability Reform, 72 TEX. L. REV. 803 (1994). Moreo-
ver, contractual liability can be inefficient even when consumers are informed. See infra notes 43-
44 and accompanying text.  
 21. Avery Wiener Katz, Stanford Form Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1902 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Lewis A. Kornhauser, 
Comment, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1183 (1976) (discussing 
inefficiencies plaguing standard form contracting); see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Stand-
ardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. 
L. REV. 713, 729-35 (1997) (noting learning and network externalities can lead to inefficient con-
tracts). 
 22. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).  
 23. E.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933 (2006); How-
ard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Infor-
mation, 21 J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981); Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 679.  
 24. The informed minority argument only addresses one of the many ways in which con-
tracts can be inefficient. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (explaining contractual lia-
bility can be inefficient even when consumers know the costs and benefits of contracting over 
liability).  
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terms to everyone in order to retain the informed minority. It does not hold 
if they would fare better employing lower cost suboptimal contracts that 
only the uninformed majority will accept, but the informed minority will 
reject, because the additional profit over those consumers who accept the 
suboptimal contract exceeds the loss of business with the small number of 
information consumers.  
Thus, Schwartz and Wilde’s claim about the efficiency of contractual 
liability depends on an empirical fact: whether the percentage of consum-
ers who read and fully understand particular standard form contracts is 
sufficiently large to motivate producers to offer optimal, but costlier, con-
tracts in order to retain them. This question is best answered with empirical 
evidence.  
Empirical scholars have provided this evidence. Their findings do not 
support the optimality of standard form contracting. An important study 
of end-user license agreements provides evidence that, at least in that area, 
if not others, there are too few informed consumers to exert any market 
discipline on contract terms. An examination of clickstream data from over 
48,000 consumers of 90 online software companies found that only 1-2 out 
of every 1,000 consumers (or 0.1-0.2%) accessed the contract terms. More-
over, most of those people only read a small portion of the contract.25 This 
evidence that only a small percentage of online consumers read standard 
form contracts has broader implications because the costs to consumers of 
accessing and reading these agreements is quite low—lower than say the 
cost of reading through the extensive standard form contracts that hospi-
tals require patients to sign as a prerequisite to getting treatment. This ev-
idence thus arguably suggests that one cannot assume that an adequate in-
formed minority exists—at least absent convincing evidence that it does. 
This result contributes to theory by altering the justifiable assumptions that 
can be made about whether there exists an adequately large informed mi-
nority, thereby altering both the predictions and normative conclusions of 
the existing theoretical models.26 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 25. Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to 
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014). Moreover, those consumers who do access 
the contract spend far too little time reading it to read it completely or digest its material terms. 
Id.; see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More Than You Wanted to Know About the Failures 
of Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63, 66-70 (2015); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & 
Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 240 (2013) (highlighting the trend towards longer and more complex standard 
form consumer contracts).  
 26. Evidence that people do not read standard form contracts is one of the reasons that 
Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider conclude that other interventions tend to be superior to 
mandatory disclosure. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2010). 
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2. Empirical Evidence Inducing Changes to the Information 
Structure of Theoretical Models 
In addition to altering the policy implications of existing theories, em-
pirical analyses can provide insights that motivate theorists to alter their 
theoretical models in ways that alter both predictive and normative con-
clusions. For example, economic models of medical malpractice have 
evolved to reflect insights from empirical analysis about the information 
environment affecting medical providers’ and patients’ choices.  
Law and economics analysis of medical malpractice has its roots in the 
classic law and economics models of torts involving victims and injurers in 
consensual relationships (for example, products liability). In these models, 
a potential injurer (here the doctor) provides a service to the potential vic-
tim (here the patient) that can harm the victim. The expected harm de-
pends on choices made by the injurer. The victim does not have sufficient 
information about the potential injurer’s actions to either assess expected 
harm or optimally regulate the injurer’s behavior by contract.27  
This model implies that, absent liability, medical markets are not effi-
cient because physicians do not have adequate incentives to incur costs to 
improve patients’ expected welfare since patients cannot assess quality dif-
ferences in either providers or treatment choices.28 This classic model con-
cludes that negligence liability could induce physicians to provide the op-
timal treatment so long as the standard of care is set at the optimal 
treatment and expected damages equal the victim’s harm. 
According to the classic model, optimal tort liability eliminates all risk 
to patients of being harmed by negligent treatment. This model also im-
plies that super-compensatory damages would not cause physicians to take 
excessive care as long as courts set due care correctly, because physicians 
can avoid any risk of excessive damages by taking due care.29  
Yet the conclusion that injurers will not be negligent in equilibrium is 
inconsistent with empirical evidence that patients face a material risk of 
being harmed by negligent treatment.30 This evidence suggests that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 27. The formal models of tort liability governing voluntary relationships focus on prod-
ucts liability. E.g., Spence, supra note 17; Polinsky, supra note 17; Shavell, supra note 17. Law and 
economics scholars also apply these models to medical malpractice. See infra note 42. 
 28. See, e.g., Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 18; Arrow, supra note 17, at 951. 
 29. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984); see Shavell, 
supra note 17. Super-compensatory damages could induce injurers to take excessive care if courts 
err, unless either causation rules eliminate the discontinuity under negligence, Marcel Kahan, 
Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1989), 
or the errors substantially favor the defendant, Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence 
and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986), as is likely with medical mal-
practice cases. See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024 (2006).  
 30. E.g., PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, 
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 43-44 (1993) (finding that 3.7% of 
hospital patients were victims of an error that caused significant harm based on a review of written 
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model does not accurately predict the operation of the tort system. It does 
not indicate whether or how the model should be modified, however. For 
example, the model makes several assumptions about how the tort system 
operates that are not realistic. It assumes that damages equal the social cost 
of the harm, when in fact tort damages for death and injury are substan-
tially less than the social cost of the harm caused.31 It also assumes that 
negligent injurers are always held liable, whereas negligent physicians are 
rarely held liable.32 Yet these differences with the actual tort system do not 
necessarily imply that normative theorists should alter their models. In-
stead, they indicate that legislatures should reform the tort system.  
Yet these are not the only ways in which the classic model deviates 
from the real world. Empirical evidence on medical error reveals that a 
central assumption of the classic model about injurers’ decision-making en-
vironment is inconsistent with physicians’ actual decision-making environ-
ment. The classic model assumes that injurers are fully and costlessly in-
formed about the appropriate level of care. It assumes that each physician 
is fully informed about the costs and benefits of the available treatments 
and is in complete control of whether she is negligent or non-negligent. As 
a result, a physician always knows when she is negligent. There is no acci-
dental or unintended medical negligence. All negligence is deliberate.33 
In actuality, physicians regularly are not fully and costlessly informed 
about either the nature of the patient’s condition or the optimal treatment. 
Instead, they must incur costs (both before and after meeting the patient) 
to obtain information (hereinafter expertise) needed to properly diagnose 
patients and identify and provide the optimal treatment. Moreover, physi-
cians who optimally invest in expertise nevertheless may not be sufficiently 
informed to properly diagnose and treat the patient. As a result, physicians 
can unintentionally provide the wrong treatment believing it to be correct. 
Indeed, empirical studies find that inadequate knowledge is a leading cause 
of medical error.34 Thus, in contrast to the classic model in which all negli-
gence is deliberate, the empirical evidence finds that a substantial portion 
                                                                                                                                                                                
hospital records); Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults 
in the United States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED.  2635, 2641 (2003) (finding that patients on average 
receive only about 55% of recommended care).  
 31. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Note, An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for 
Wrongful Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1985). 
 32. Patients who are injured by medical negligence rarely sue their doctors. E.g., David 
M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 
MED. CARE 250, 255 (2000) (finding that ninety-seven percent of the patients injured by medical 
negligence did not sue). When they do sue, they often lose. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 12-13 (1991) (finding that only one in three victims of medical error who 
suffered serious injuries were awarded damages).  
 33. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 17. 
 34. E.g., Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The Role 
of Individual and System Factors in Causing Medical Injuries, 96 GEO. L.J. 599, 606 tbl.1 (2008) 
(finding that forty-eight percent of medical errors that produced a claim were attributable, at least 
in part, to the physician’s lack of technical competence or knowledge); see also ATUL GAWANDE, 
COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT SCIENCE 197-98 (2003) (discussing 
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of medical negligence is accidental, resulting from inadequate information. 
The risk of accidental error is endogenous—each physician can reduce it 
by investing more in expertise. 
Empirical analysis thus reveals that, in order to induce physicians to 
provide optimal care, the tort system has to regulate two quite different 
decisions. It needs to ensure that informed physicians have optimal incen-
tives to select and provide the optimal treatment when informed. In addi-
tion, the tort system needs to provide physicians with optimal incentives to 
invest in the information needed to be able to determine and provide op-
timal care (expertise).  
The tort system regulates these two types of care through liability im-
posed for two different forms of negligence. Under the tort system, the due 
care determination is predicated on treatment choice; courts do not (and 
cannot) take into account whether, over a physician’s career, the physician 
invested optimally in expertise. Thus, the tort system regulates treatment 
choice directly through the due care standard, which imposes liability on 
physicians who harm a patient by providing negligent treatment. The 
threat of liability for negligence can be used to ensure that physicians who 
are informed about the optimal treatment select it, instead of providing 
less expensive suboptimal treatment. Physicians’ incentives to invest in ex-
pertise is determined by the threat of liability for accidental medical er-
ror—liability that physicians can reduce, but not eliminate, by investing 
optimally in expertise.35  
Thus, empirical evidence about the sources of medical error reveals 
both an additional goal for tort liability—regulation of investment in ex-
pertise—and an additional pathway through which it impacts behavior—
liability for accidental error. Accordingly, in order to make normative pol-
icy prescriptions that reflect the purposes and effects of tort liability, we 
need to alter the theoretical model to more accurately describe the physi-
cian’s informational environment and choice set.36  
Theorists have developed a model of medical malpractice in which 
physicians take two different forms of care: treatment choice and invest-
ment in the information needed to select and provide optimal treatment. 
In this model, physicians can be negligent in one of two ways. They can 
deliberately provide suboptimal treatment (as in the classic model) or they 
                                                                                                                                                                                
how autopsies of patients who died in a hospital revealed that one-third likely would have lived if 
properly diagnosed and treated); JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 24 (2007) (ex-
plaining evidence suggests that ten to fifteen percent of physicians’ diagnoses are incorrect).  
 35. See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 18; Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Torts, 
Expertise, and Authority: Liability of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 36 RAND J. 
ECON. 494 (2005). 
 36. This evidence on accidental error also highlights a deviation between negligence in 
daily life and the standard model that warrants attention: while certainly there are many instances 
of people who knowingly breach their duty of care—which is the only form of negligence possible 
in the standard model—there appear to be numerous instances of injurers who were uncertain 
whether their conduct constituted optimal care or not. 
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can do so accidentally. Physicians can reduce, but not eliminate, their risk 
of providing suboptimal treatment accidentally by investing in expertise.37 
To induce optimal care, tort liability needs to regulate both choices.  
Analysis of this model has shown that tort liability for negligence can 
optimally regulate both choices.38 The standard of care (which is predi-
cated on whether the physician selected the medically appropriate treat-
ment) regulates treatment choice. Liability for failure to select the appro-
priate treatment will operate to induce informed physicians—those who 
are correctly informed about the patient’s illness and available treat-
ments—to select the optimal treatment if expected damages for knowing 
negligence equal or exceed the cost to the physician of providing optimal 
treatment. As in the classic model, super-compensatory damages will not 
induce excessive treatment, provided that courts do not err in setting the 
standard of care. These results are consistent with the classic model.39  
Yet in this model, unlike the classic model, physicians are negligent in 
equilibrium, because providers face an omnipresent risk of selecting the 
suboptimal treatment accidentally. This risk of liability for accidental error 
operates to provide incentives for physicians to invest in expertise: the 
higher their level of expertise the lower their risk of error. Because physi-
cians cannot avoid the risk of accidental error by investing optimally in ex-
pertise, liability for accidental error in effect imposes a form of strict liabil-
ity on the physician’s choice to invest in expertise.40  
Economic analysis of tort liability for accidental error differs from the 
results of the classic model in three ways. First, as already noted, physicians 
are negligent in equilibrium even when courts are assumed to accurately 
assess the standard of care. This result is consistent with the empirical evi-
dence on physician error.  
Second, optimal expected damages for accidental error are less than 
either the actual or the expected injury to the patient from suboptimal 
treatment. In order to optimally regulate expertise, expected damages for 
accidental error need to be predicated on the social benefit of expertise. 
The social benefit of expertise is increasing the likelihood that the patient 
receives optimal treatment instead of suboptimal treatment. This benefit 
is less than the harm caused from suboptimal treatment whenever either 
(1) physicians with optimal expertise nevertheless may provide suboptimal 
treatment or (2) the optimal treatment reduces, but does not eliminate, the 
patient’s risk of suffering the same bad outcome as the suboptimal treat-
ment.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
 37. Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 35; see Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 18; see also 
Jennifer H. Arlen, Economics of Tort Law, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
41 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) (extending the model to other types of torts where determining 
optimal care is costly). 
 38. See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 35.  
 39. See id.  
 40. See id.  
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Finally, the analysis shows that super-compensatory damages are in-
efficient because they cause physicians to over-invest in expertise. Because 
physicians cannot avoid the risk of liability by investing in optimal exper-
tise—since they still might accidentally provide negligent treatment—phy-
sicians facing excessive damages will over-invest in expertise (including 
tests) to reduce their expected liability.41  
Interestingly, altering the model of medical malpractice to reflect the 
insights of empirical analysis also reveals an aspect of “care” that has im-
plications for the previously discussed debate over whether contracting 
over liability is optimal. Scholars employing the classic model of torts have 
claimed that states should allow medical providers to contract with patients 
over liability. They assert that contracting will result in the optimal impo-
sition of liability, assuming that patients are informed about the costs and 
benefits of imposing liability by contract.42  
One problem with this argument is that patients do not know precisely 
how liability will affect their risk of being harmed by medical error. Yet the 
preceding analysis reveals that this is not the only weakness in the argu-
ment for contractual liability. The preceding analysis reveals that contract-
ing over liability would be inefficient even if patients were perfectly in-
formed about the costs and benefits of imposing liability by contract. 
Informed patients would not contract into liability even when they 
would benefit from tort liability because contractual liability benefits them 
less than tort liability. Contractual liability and tort liability are different 
because malpractice liability does not simply serve to induce physicians to 
take care that benefits a specific patient. Empirical analysis reveals that 
liability is needed to regulate a form of care—investment in expertise—
that benefits many, if not all, of a physician’s patients, by increasing her 
ability to diagnose and select appropriate treatment.43 Expertise, and thus 
the tort liability for accidental negligence that induces it, is a collective 
good.  
Given this, contracting over liability would not be efficient even if pa-
tients did know the expected costs and benefits to them of liability imposed 
by contract because individual contracting over collective goods is not ef-
ficient. Physicians’ incentives to invest in expertise depend on their ex-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 41. See id. 
 42. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 87, 94-95, 149 (1976); Glen O. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical 
Malpractice Risks Between Patients and Providers, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 198 (1986). By 
contrast, health care economists tend to focus on analyzing the numerous inefficiencies plaguing 
health care contracts. See generally HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS (Anthony J. Culyer & 
Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000); Joseph P. Newhouse, Economics of Health Insurance, in 3 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 872, 872-75 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. 
Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).  
 43. Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost of 
Choice, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 957, 992 (2010); Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 18. 
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pected liability to all of their patients. As a result, no one patient contract-
ing for liability could provide a physician with optimal incentives. They all 
would need to impose liability together. When required to contract indi-
vidually, each patient would have an incentive not to incur the cost of con-
tractual liability in the expectation of free-riding on the liability decisions 
of others. Thus, even if each patient is better off if liability is imposed, each 
would have an incentive to select the lower cost “no liability” contract 
knowing that her individual decision would have little impact on the phy-
sician’s incentives to invest in expertise. As a result, every patient could 
contract out of liability even if it is optimal for all to contract into it.44 
B. Evidence Prompting Expansion of the Potential Set of Options 
To predict behavior, a theoretical model also needs to accurately cap-
ture the material options available to people making the decisions being 
modeled. Empirical analysis can and has helped theoretical scholars iden-
tify situations where the standard theoretical model does not accurately 
predict behavior because it does not include all the actual options availa-
ble. Empirical analysis has helped identify such situations both directly and 
indirectly, through evidence that actual choices diverge from predicted 
ones. This divergence has led theoreticians to reexamine the actual deci-
sion-making environment to identify options that people actually employ 
that the existing theory had not taken into account. 
One area where empirical analysis has enriched theory indirectly by 
leading scholars to expand the option set employed in theoretical analysis 
is the economic analysis of takeover defenses. The threat of a hostile—and, 
for managers, potentially career-ending—acquisition represents an im-
portant mechanism for reducing managers’ temptation to pursue personal 
interests at the expense of firm value. Yet Delaware law potentially mutes 
this disciplining effect by granting the board of directors considerable dis-
cretion to adopt defensive measures, such as the poison pill and effective 
classified board, which deter hostile acquisitions.45 Leading corporate 
scholars have called on Delaware courts to change the law. They claim that, 
although director control of ordinary business decisions is appropriate, 
shareholders, not directors, should have ultimate authority to decide 
whether to accept a takeover bid. Thus, courts should adopt a “shareholder 
choice” rule under which directors must grant shareholders the ability to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 44. See Arlen, supra note 43 (discussing inefficiencies with contractual liability resulting 
from collective goods, adverse selection, and renegotiation); Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, 
Should Consumers Be Permitted to Waive Products Liability? Product Safety, Private Contracts, 
and Adverse Selection, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 734 (2014); Abraham L. Wickelgren, The Ineffi-
ciency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 168 
(2006). 
  45. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered 
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 928 (2002) (finding poison pills plus 
an “effective staggered board” is an effective takeover defense). 
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vote on whether to pursue an acquisition and, following a positive vote, 
must remove any defenses that would impede the hostile action.46  
The classic economic framework employed to support this analysis 
treats the threat of a hostile acquisition as shareholders’ primary option for 
ameliorating agency costs. It also treats takeover defenses of the type that 
would be governed by a shareholder choice rule as management’s only op-
tion for deterring a hostile bid (aside from simply maximizing firm value). 
In this framework, economic analysis would appear to support the claim 
that courts should require management to eventually submit all hostile bids 
to shareholders.47  
One implication of this analysis is that adopting takeover defenses 
should reduce a firm’s value. This suggests that informed shareholders—
particularly institutions—should place a higher value on corporations that 
do not permit the board to adopt and maintain takeover defenses over 
shareholders objections. Yet empirical evidence reveals that this is not nec-
essarily the case.48 
For example, consider evidence on the corporate contracts of firms 
that go public. Owners of firms going public have strong incentives to go 
public with corporate charter provisions that shareholders—specifically in-
stitutional shareholders—prefer in order to maximize the amount received 
from the initial public offering (IPO). Thus, one might expect companies 
going public to place restrictions on their boards’ ability to adopt takeover 
defenses. Yet Robert Daines and Michael Klausner found that companies 
regularly go public with takeover defenses, such as classified boards and 
actual or shadow poison pills. Moreover, shareholders purchasing IPO 
shares do not appear to impose a penalty on firms that go public with take-
over defenses.49  
                                                                                                                                                                                
 46. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeo-
vers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 976, 1027-28 (2002) (arguing that shareholders should be permitted 
to vote on whether to pursue a tender offer); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s 
Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 559-63 (2002) 
(arguing that managers should be allowed to “Just Say No” temporarily but should not be allowed 
preclude a shareholder vote on a bid forever); see also Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach 
to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 848-
65 (1981) (arguing for shareholder authority over tender offers). 
 47. See supra note 46. 
 48. The empirical evidence on the impact of takeover defenses on firm value is mixed. 
See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law and Governance: Some Steps 
Forward and Some Steps Not, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE 184 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018); Miroslava Straska & H. 
Gregory Waller, Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature, 49 
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 933 (2014).  
 49. Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Anti-
Takeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 85-86 (2001) (finding that anti-takeover 
provisions are common at the IPO stage, and that about half the IPO firms studied adopted the 
strongest anti-takeover protections). 
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In addition, there is evidence that the adoption and removal of clear-
day poison pills does not have a significant effect on firm value.50 In addi-
tion, classified board destaggering does not clearly increase in firm value.51 
Both findings are inconsistent with the conclusions of the classic model that 
shareholders view these two takeover defenses as a threat to firm value.52 
Finally, evidence showed that notwithstanding Delaware’s decision to 
grant corporate boards broad authority to “just say no” to a hostile bid, the 
acquisitions market remained robust.53 
This raises the question of why the evidence is not confirming the pre-
dictions of the theory. Scholars explored several potential explanations.54 
Theorists have concluded that the standard model does not fully capture 
all the options available to both shareholders and to managers.  
Specifically, the classic model does not capture the full set of options 
available to firms (and thus to shareholders) for reducing agency costs. 
Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock concluded that shareholders and firms 
have other options for muting managerial agency costs in the takeover con-
text beyond restrictions on takeover defenses.55 These options include 
measures that reduce management’s ability to resist an attractive hostile 
bid—such as requiring that a majority of the board be independent. They 
also include options designed to provide management with direct financial 
incentives to favor an acquisition—for example, through substantial grants 
of unvested options that vest upon a change of control.56 Firms and their 
shareholders have good reason to prefer such solutions to placing re-
strictions on boards’ ability to defend against a hostile bid, to the extent 
that shareholders benefit from granting authority to the board to negotiate 
with raiders.57 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 50. Emiliano M. Catan, The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1 (2019) (finding that removal of a poison pill does not increase firm value and adoption of a 
poison pill tends to be preceded by a fall in firm value but does not itself trigger a fall in firm 
value). 
 51. Emiliano Catan and Michael Klausner found that declassification has not had a sig-
nificant effect on firm value. See Catan & Klausner, supra note 4.  
 52. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 45 (finding that an effective classified board coupled 
with an actual or shadow poison pill is an effective impediment to hostile takeovers). 
 53. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002). 
 54. This evidence does not necessarily imply that shareholder choice is not optimal if 
special considerations affect corporate contracts at the IPO stage. See Michael Klausner, Institu-
tional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 755 (2003).  
 55. Kahan & Rock, supra note 53, at 896-97 (arguing that managerial choice is less costly 
than many assert because shareholders have employed adaptive mechanisms, such as executive 
incentive compensation, to mute the agency costs associated with managerial choice); see Ellie G. 
Harris, Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Shareholder Welfare, 21 
RAND J. ECON. 614 (1990). 
 56. See supra note 55. 
 57. See, e.g., Harry DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments 
and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 329 (1983); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corpo-
rate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
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The classic model also does not capture the full set of options availa-
ble to managers for blocking acquisitions. Specifically, it does not incorpo-
rate the fact that, if shareholder choice were adopted, managers would still 
retain options to deter hostile bids—options that could be more costly to 
shareholders than are standard takeover defenses. Eric Talley and I con-
cluded that shareholders might not want to block directors from employing 
standard takeover defenses because managers unable to protect their jobs 
through the use of poison pills would be motivated to employ other, more 
costly, measures to deter unwanted acquisitions—measures that would not 
be governed by a shareholder choice rule. Specifically, managers can deter 
acquisitions by embedding defenses in ordinary business transactions, gov-
erned by the business judgement rule (hereinafter “embedded defenses”). 
For example, they can place costly change of control provisions in contracts 
such as joint venture agreements, intellectual property licenses, customer 
service agreements, or debt contracts—provisions which impose substan-
tial costs on the firm in the event of any change of control. Yet embedded 
defenses may deter friendly, as well as hostile, acquisitions. Shareholders 
thus would have good reason to conclude that they are better off when 
boards have authority to defend against hostile bids, provided that the firm 
adopts measure that incentivize managers to allow acquisitions to go 
through, than they would be under shareholder choice.58  
These examples are only illustrative of the many ways that empirical 
analysis can, and has, enriched law and economics by spurring theorists to 
identify choice options that are material in the real world but had not been 
incorporated into theoretical models.  
III. From Rational Choice to Behavioral Law and Economics and Back 
Again 
A theoretical model also can only be relied on to predict outcomes 
and guide policy if it accurately captures the material features of the deci-
sion-making processes that people use systematically when making deci-
sions. Determining how to model human decision-making may be the most 
important challenge currently facing law and economics; it is a challenge 
that empirical analysis is playing a vital role in addressing. 
Classic law and economics assumes that people employ rational 
choice theory. This assumption appears to be valid in some situations but 
                                                                                                                                                                                
473, 484-88 (2003) (arguing that shareholders may get better deals when directors have full au-
thority to negotiate that includes authority to reject a bid). 
 58. Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder 
Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (2003); see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover 
Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 
931, 954 (1993) (discussing mangers’ defensive use of debt covenants with penalty-imposing 
change of control provisions); Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987, 1006-07 (1994) (discussing the issuance of sweetheart preferred stock 
as a takeover defense).  
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not in others. A growing body of empirical and experimental evidence re-
veals that people often do not make decisions consistent with rational 
choice theory. Instead, they deviate in systematic ways from the predic-
tions of rational choice. Examples of systematic deviations include evi-
dence on the endowment effect, preferences for fairness, hindsight bias, 
and egocentric biases.59 
Many theorists have responded by developing theoretical behavioral 
law and economics analyses that take these biases and heuristics into ac-
count, developing normative theories that are premised on the assumption 
that people making decisions in the real world always exhibit the biases 
and heuristics found in the laboratory experiments.60 This effort to expand 
law and economics theory to take into account new evidence on human 
decision-making is producing important contributions. 
Yet scholars ploughing these fertile fields face an enormous challenge: 
at present, scholars generally cannot predict whether and when many of 
the biases and heuristics will affect decision-making in any particular real-
world situation. This is the case for three reasons.  
First, we do not yet fully understand the root causes of many biases 
and heuristics. As a result, we often do not know (and cannot predict) their 
domain. Indeed, many of the biases that scholars regularly treat as nearly 
omnipresent—such as the endowment effect—are present in some situa-
tions and not in others. Moreover, they are not present in some situations 
where existing theory predicts that they should be manifest.61  
Second, and related, experimental results cannot necessarily be relied 
on to predict real world decisions. There are many reasons for this. Two 
are particularly important. The first is that people appear to use multiple, 
interacting, decision-making programs when making decisions. One type 
is conscious and more deliberative and rational. The other type is non-con-
scious or intuitive decision-making programs that are often impacted by 
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biases, heuristics, and emotions.62 The interaction between these programs 
is context dependent. Thus, decision-making in the lab may differ from de-
cision-making in the real world depending on whether features of the real 
world context cause the more deliberative processes to dominate.63 In ad-
dition, and related, both theory and evidence suggests that people’s incli-
nation to exhibit certain deviations from an egocentric rational choice—
such as the endowment effect and fairness preferences—is affected by 
whether they decide autonomously (as in many laboratory experiments) or 
within an institution that enables them to spread responsibility for the de-
cision—such as agency relationships or voting. Experiments have found 
that agency relationships and voting can mute, if not eliminate, both the 
endowment effect and the preference for fairness.64 This is important be-
cause many, if not most decisions in the market context involve agents; or-
ganizational decision-making is dominated by responsibility-spreading in-
stitutions, including voting.  
Indeed, there is evidence that people strategically employ institutions 
in order to debias. When faced with a situation where a bias or heuristic 
(for example, regret aversion or fairness preferences) might cause them 
not to maximize their financial welfare, people appear to engage in strate-
gic bias self-management. They employ institutions and other measures 
that spread responsibility in order to mute the bias or heuristic, thereby 
enabling them to make the choice that serves their narrow self-interest, 
consistent with rational choice theory.65 
Thus, empirical, experimental, and neuro-economic analysis has 
greatly enhanced our understanding of human decision-making. In so do-
ing, it has revealed the need to alter the classic models in law and econom-
ics. But these analyses also have revealed that human decision-making is 
complex. Our understanding of it is still evolving. This creates challenges 
for those seeking to develop models that can reliably predict how people 
will respond when making a range of decisions. A combination of theory, 
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experimental evidence, and data-driven empirical analysis will enable 
scholars to develop more robust theories of human decision-making to 
serve as a foundation for future theoretical analysis.  
Conclusion 
Theoretical law and economics has benefited from insights provided 
by empirical analysis throughout its history. Empirical analysis has repeat-
edly helped scholars identify situations where an existing theoretical model 
needed to be revised. Empirical analysis has prompted reform both di-
rectly and indirectly. Empirical analysis has spurred change indirectly 
when it produces robust results that are inconsistent with the theoretical 
predictions. These results, when confirmed by multiple valid studies, pro-
vide an important impetus for scholars to reexamine the foundations of 
their models in order to identify the facets of the decision-making environ-
ment as set forth in the model that are inconsistent with the actual decision-
making environment. Empirical analysis has induced changes directly by 
providing evidence about actual decision-making environments (or actual 
decision-making processes) that differ materially from those currently fa-
vored by theorists. This interaction between theory and empirical analysis 
is an exciting and ongoing source of new insights. It is vital to theory’s abil-
ity to develop models that enable scholars to reliably describe and predict 
how people respond to legal rules in the real world. 
The insights gleaned from this interaction does present challenges. 
First, as theoretical models have gotten more sophisticated—for example, 
incorporating asymmetric information and incomplete contracting—they 
also have gotten more mathematically complex. This adds to the challenges 
of both developing new theoretical frameworks and presenting the analysis 
in a way that is generally accessible. Second, as theory has increasingly 
sought to incorporate insights about human decision-making, the limita-
tions of our existing understanding of human behavior has become a 
source of uncertainty as to the validity of theoretical law and economics 
models as well. This is less of a concern in those areas where it appears that 
people tend to engage in more deliberative decision-making, undistorted 
by biases and heuristics. Yet much remains to be done to determine when 
people’s decisions can be appropriately described using rational choice 
theory and what other decision-making functions they employ when ra-
tional choice is inapposite.  
In the meantime, normative theorists can best respond to the various 
sources of uncertainty about the validity of their models by openly as-
sessing whether their results are robust to alternative plausible assump-
tions. Theorists may do so by examining either the decision-making envi-
ronment or the decision-making processes employed by the decision-
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:480 2021 
502 
makers. They also should be appropriately circumspect about their norma-
tive conclusion when their results that depend heavily on assumptions that 
may prove not to be correct. Empiricists can assist this effort by continuing 
to help us better understand how people make decisions in general, and 
how they actually respond to legal rules in particular. The strength and fu-
ture of law and economics lies in this dialectical interaction. 
